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Abstract 
This paper presents probabilistic population projections for five regions of Asia (South 
Asia, Central Asia, China region, Pacific OECD and Pacific Asia) and Asia as a whole. 
Over this century, Asia will experience a very heterogeneous demographic 
development: Central Asia is still expected to almost double its population and South 
Asia will become by far the world’s most populous region, rapidly surpassing the China 
region. Simultaneously, today’s Pacific OECD countries are likely to shrink in size and 
experience extreme population aging. The proportion of the population above age 60 in 
these countries (with Japan having the greatest weight) is expected to reach an 
incredible 50 percent of the total population (with the 95 percent uncertainty interval 
ranging from 35 to 61 percent). The China region will experience a more rapid speed of 
aging with the proportion above age 60 expected to increase by a factor of four from 10 
percent in 2000 to 39 percent in 2100. 
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The End of Population Growth in Asia 
Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov 
When we talk about the future population of Asia, the outlook today is very different 
from the one that demographers had some decades ago. At that time rapid population 
growth in Asia was the overriding concern. Today the population is still growing rapidly 
in many parts of Asia, but growth has significantly slowed in other parts, and the 
possibility that population growth in Asia may come to an end over the course of this 
century is in sight. 
This paper presents the to-date unpublished results of recent probabilistic world 
population projections for five Asian regions. The methodology has been discussed 
elsewhere (Lutz et al. 2001) and therefore will only be summarized here. 
Asia is currently in the midst of a fertility transition from high to low levels with 
different parts of Asia being at different stages of this transition. Although this 
demographic transition is assumed to be a universal phenomenon, both the speed of 
decline and the ultimate fertility levels are uncertain. The level of the total fertility rate 
(TFR) in Southeast Asia in 2030 or in China in 2050 is not yet known. But fertility is 
not the only uncertainty in population projections. The future trends in life expectancy 
and migration are equally uncertain. While it used to be widely assumed that life 
expectancy would increase in all countries to maximum levels of 80-85 years and then 
stay constant, recent studies show tremendous scientific uncertainty on this issue. Some 
people think that humankind is already close to the limit of the human life span, while 
others stress that if there is a limit, it is beyond 120 years and that already today in low 
mortality countries half of the girl babies born can expect to live beyond age 100. The 
volume of international migration is even less predictable because it is also heavily 
influenced by unforeseeable political developments in different parts of the world. 
How should population forecasters deal with these major uncertainties? One 
possibility is to simply refuse to make forecasts beyond two or three decades. The 
problem with this attitude is that there is a demand for longer-range forecasts, especially 
in the context of assessing the impacts of other long-term changes such as global 
climate change. Complete probability-free if-then scenarios also do not fully satisfy this 
demand. Demographers have a lot of knowledge based on which future trends are more 
likely than others. The challenge is to produce forecasts that explicitly address and even 
quantify this uncertainty. 
The currently most popular way to deal with such uncertainty – which is 
practiced by the UN Population Division as well as many national statistical offices – is 
to produce a high and low variant in addition to the medium variant which represents 
the future path considered most likely. The high-low range is said to cover a ‘plausible 
range’ of possible future paths. Unfortunately there are three serious problems with this 
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‘variants approach.’ First, the variants only show the impacts of alternative future 
fertility paths typically assuming identical mortality and migration paths. Given the high 
uncertainty in these two other factors, this approach is clearly deficient. Second, it is not 
clear what ‘plausible range’ exactly means. For the user it makes a big difference 
whether the given range covers 100 percent or only 60 percent of all paths considered 
possible. Third, when national level high and low variants are aggregated to regional or 
global level variants, this approach becomes probabilistically inconsistent (National 
Research Council 2000) because it is far from certain that all countries simultaneously 
follow the high or low paths. In reality, trends will deviate from the expectation in 
different ways in different countries. Only fully probabilistic projections can deal with 
these problems in a satisfactory way. 
Different Approaches to Probabilistic Population Projections 
Since the cohort component method of projection is taken as a standard, the differences 
between alternative approaches discussed here refer only to the modeling of future 
fertility, mortality and migration rates. Here one can distinguish between (a) the specific 
process chosen for representing the time series of rates, and (b) the basis for the specific 
assumptions made about the future range of uncertainty. 
In the literature there are essentially two ways of specifying the series of vital 
rates: (1) processes with annual fluctuations (Lee 1999; Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994; Lee 
and Carter 1992; Alho 1990) and (2) piece-wise linear scenarios (Lutz et al. 1997; Lutz 
et al. 1996; Lutz and Scherbov 1998). While (2) has the advantage of conforming to the 
current practice of scenario definition in statistical offices around the world (including 
the UN (1999) and the World Bank (2000)), (1) can produce realistic annual 
fluctuations given that the possible levels are bounded. The following moving average 
model with annual fluctuations has been chosen, in order to avoid the argument that the 
model underestimates variance (Lee 1999). 
Let v be a vital rate to be forecasted for periods 1 through T and vt the forecasted 
value at time t.  
ttt
vv += , where the mean of v, 
t
v  and its standard deviation at time t, 
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t
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 The literature suggests three approaches to derive assumptions about the future 
range of uncertainty of the components: (1) to compute a measure of the future error 
from the ex post analysis of past projections (Alho 1997; Keilman 1999; Stoto 1983); 
(2) to apply time series models (Lee 1999; Tuljapurkar et al. 2000; Lee and Tuljapurkar 
1994); and (3) to have well informed experts make assumptions based on explicitly 
stated substantive arguments (Lutz et al. 1999). These three approaches are not mutually 
exclusive and (1) and (2) also include expert judgment. 
In this set of probabilistic projections, a step toward a synthesis of the three 
approaches is taken. The process specification uses a time series model. Existing 
national level parameter estimates (Lee and Tuljapurkar 1994; Lee and Carter 1992) 
have been explicitly considered, although at the level of world regions, empirical 
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estimation is impossible due to lack of data. The ex post analysis of past errors enters 
this study in two ways: The substantive assumptions made on fertility and mortality 
changes are informed by the analysis of past errors in those components (National 
Research Council 2000; Keilman 1999) and the results at the regional level have been 
compared to the results of an ex post error analysis of global UN projections 
documented in the National Research Council (2000) report. Since for the specific 
purpose of this paper it was preferred to err on the side of higher variance (i.e., lower 
probability of population growth ending this century) the general rule was followed, to 
produce intervals that were at least as large as those in the National Research Council 
(2000) report at the level of major world regions. Combining this with argument-based 
expert judgment (Lutz 1996), substantive reasons were found for assuming a larger 
uncertainty in many regions due to new factors such as HIV/AIDS, the new situation in 
the former USSR and the indeterminancy of long-range, post-transitional fertility levels 
affecting an increasing number of countries. 
Assumptions 
The key determinant of the timing of the peak in population size is the assumed speed of 
fertility decline in the parts of Asia that still have high fertility. On this issue there is a 
broad consensus that fertility transitions are likely to be completed in the next few 
decades (National Research Council 2000). For the eventual size of the population and 
the question of whether or not world population will begin a decline by the end of this 
century the key variable is the assumed level of post-transitional fertility. The thorough 
review of the literature on that subject by the National Research Council states that 
“fertility in countries that have not completed transition should eventually reach levels 
similar to those now observed in low fertility countries” (National Research Council 
2000:106). The fertility assumptions given here are consistent with this view. 
The trends in the means of the regional fertility levels have been defined for the 
periods 2025-29 and 2080-84 with interpolations in between. The total fertility rates 
assumed for 2025-29 are similar to those chosen by the UN (1999), but for 2080-84 they 
are assumed to range between 1.5 and 2.0, with lower levels for regions with higher 
population density in 2030. The variances in the total fertility rates are assumed to 
depend on the level of fertility. If the TFR is above 3.0 there is an 80 percent chance 
that fertility would be within one child of the mean. When it is below 2.0, the same 
probability is attached to a range within one half a child of the mean. Between the two 
TFR levels, the variance is interpolated. 
Life expectancy at birth was assumed to rise in all five Asian regions studied 
here. Generally, it is assumed that life expectancy increases by two years per decade 
with an 80 percent probability that the increase is between zero and four years, with a 
number of exceptions to this rule based on specific regional conditions. These 
assumptions reflect the very large uncertainty that exists regarding future mortality 
conditions. On the one hand, significant bio-medical breakthroughs are likely to be 
made; on the other hand, AIDS could still become a major issue outside Africa, and new 
and unexpected threats to human life can emerge. 
Migration is treated as a random vector based on recent interregional migration 
patterns. The autocorrelation chosen for all components is based on a 31-year moving 
average process which was the most plausible after experimenting with 21, 31 and 41 
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years, and is close to existing national level figures (Lee 1999). An interregional 
correlation of 0.7 for fertility and 0.9 for mortality deviations was assumed, with no 
correlation between fertility and mortality deviations from the assumed trend, and 
perfect correlation between male and female life expectancy. The main rationale behind 
this choice is that under post-transition conditions, correlations between deviations from 
assumed fertility and mortality trends are unlikely to be large, while globalization of 
communication is likely to bring correlated fluctuations of rates among world regions. 
Mortality correlations will be higher than fertility correlations due to the faster 
communication of medical technology and the faster spread of new health hazards. 
Results 
Based on these assumptions 1,000 independent cohort component simulations were 
carried out for each region by randomly drawing from the uncertainty distributions for 
fertility, mortality and migration using the specified correlations. The resulting 
distributions for the five Asian regions (see Appendix Map) and for all five regions 
together are presented in terms of the fractiles of the distributions in the following 
graphs. The quantitative data for all five regions and different demographic indicators 
are given in the Appendix Tables 1-5. 
Figure 1 gives the cumulative probabilities that the population size of the 
specified region will reach a peak at or before the stated point in time. For the global 
level Lutz et al. (2001) estimated a probability of roughly 85 percent that the world 
population will reach a peak before the end of the century. For all five Asian regions 
together the pattern is rather similar to the global one. Mostly because of momentum, 
the probability that the total Asian population will reach a peak (followed by a decline) 
is close to zero until around 2020. Then it slowly starts to increase. By 2060 there is 
about a 50 percent chance that the Asian population will have peaked. By the end of the 
century the chance is about 90 percent. 
The patterns in Figure 1 are quite diverse for the different parts of Asia. The 
highest probability of peaking is in the Pacific OECD region, which is clearly 
dominated by the trends in Japan. There, the probability of a peak increases rapidly over 
time with a 50 percent chance reached around 2025. By 2050 the chance of peaking 
increases to around 70 percent. Interestingly, the China region reaches the same level by 
the same time, but shows a very different path during the first half of the century. Due 
to the great age structural momentum in China – the steep fertility decline was more 
recent here than in Japan – the probability of peaking is close to zero over the next 15 
years. During the 2020s and 2030s it is expected to increase precipitously and catch up 
with the Asian OECD countries by the middle of the century. South Asia clearly shows 
the lowest probabilities of reaching a peak because of its still rather high fertility. By the 
middle of the century the chance that South Asia will have reached a peak is below 10 
percent. During the second half of the century, the chance is expected to increase based 
on the assumption of long-term, below-replacement fertility, even on the Indian 
subcontinent. 
Figures 2 and 3 contrast the uncertainty distributions for future population size 
in China and South Asia. The shading in the graphs refers to the fractiles stated at the 
right margin. The lightest shading gives the 95 percent interval; the medium shading 
shows the inner 60 percent; and the darkest shows the inner 20 percent of output 
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distributions generated by the set of simulations. The white line gives the median of the 
distribution. As can be expected, in all cases the uncertainty increases with time. For the 
China region, the median of the distributions shows an increase until a peak around 
2030-35, followed by a decline. The distribution also shows that there is at least a 20 
percent chance that the population of China will continue to grow into the second half 
of this century. But there is a chance of more than 60 percent that the population of 
China in 2100 might be lower than it is today. In contrast, the projections for South Asia 
show a very likely increase well into the second half of the century. For South Asia, the 
chance that the population size in 2100 will be lower than it is today is only less than 20 
percent. 
Using the example of age distribution in China, Figure 4 shows that the likely 
end of population growth comes with a very significant reduction in the proportion of 
children and youth below age 20. The decline is clearly pre-programmed in the age 
structure for the coming three to four decades. Thereafter, the proportion of children 
will greatly depend on the future level of fertility, in addition to the uncertain number of 
future mothers. 
Figure 5 shows the uncertainty distribution for the proportion above age 60 in 
the example of Pacific Asia (which essentially includes the countries of Southeast Asia). 
Here the trend over the coming three to four decades shows even less uncertainty than 
for the proportion of children because most of the people concerned have already been 
born und the remaining uncertainty refers mostly to mortality and migration uncertainty. 
A doubling of the proportion above age 60 over the next 40 years is almost a certainty. 
Further significant increases during the rest of the century are also very likely, although 
the uncertainty range significantly increases with time. Over the course of the century 
the proportion of elderly in this region of Asia will likely quadruple, certainly more than 
double, and possibly even increase by a factor of eight. 
Figure 6 gives an even more astonishing feature of population aging. It shows 
the expected increases in the proportion above age 80 for the Pacific OECD region. At 
present, 3.5 percent of the population is above that age. This proportion is expected to 
increase quickly over the coming decades. Due to the great uncertainty about future 
gains in life expectancy, by the end of the century, the 95 percent range goes from 
around 5 percent – which is not much higher than the current level – to an incredible 46 
percent of the population above age 80. Even the median shows a very high 25 percent 
of the population above age 80 in 2100. This extremely broad range is clearly a function 
of the broad uncertainty distribution assumed for future gains in life expectancy. 
Without having the space to discuss the specific assumptions here, this pattern clearly 
illustrates that alternative mortality assumptions do make a major difference and that 
population projections that disregard mortality uncertainty in the definition of their 
variants (such as the UN projections and those of many national statistical offices) 
clearly fail to capture an important source of uncertainty of future population changes. 
Figure 7 gives the old age dependency ratio defined here as the population above 
age 60 divided by the population aged 20 to 60, for the example of Central Asia. It is 
amazing to see that over the coming 25 years there is practically no uncertainty. The 
ratio will slightly decrease, then increase again. Since the sizes of the cohorts are 
already known, the only minor uncertainties here relate to near-term mortality and 
migration trends. For the second half of the century, however, uncertainty greatly 
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increases and by 2100, distribution shows that with a 95 percent chance, the dependency 
ratio will lie between 0.4 and 1.5. This significant uncertainty is a consequence of 
cumulating mortality and fertility uncertainties, both of which crucially affect the old 
age dependency ratio in the long run. 
Figure 8 shows the complete probabilistic age pyramid for the example of 
Pacific Asia in 2050. It nicely illustrates how significantly the uncertainty ranges differ 
among age groups. Because the birth year of the cohort is a key dimension for 
understanding the pattern, it is listed on the right vertical axis. It is evident that the base 
year of the projections, the year 2000, represents a watershed in the degree of 
uncertainty. The initial size of the cohorts born before 2000 is already known. Since 
mortality rates are rather low for young adults, the uncertainty range is lowest for those 
cohorts born between 1990 and 2000. The older the cohorts get, the bigger the 
uncertainty range due to the uncertainty in future old age mortality trends. These 
uncertainties are small, however, as compared to the distributions for cohorts born after 
2000, since for those, one does not know the initial cohort size. For cohorts to be born 
around 2025-30, a further broadening of the distribution is visible because the 
uncertainty of future fertility rates begins to become superimposed on the uncertainty of 
the cohort size of potential mothers. 
Conclusions 
This paper has applied, for the first time, a probabilistic population projection 
framework to all of Asia and its sub-regions. Such a framework can help to illustrate the 
uncertainties associated with future demographic trends and, in particular, show how 
these uncertainties differ by age, by the demographic indicator chosen, and by regions. 
In addition, it has been illustrated how the assumed uncertainty about future gains in life 
expectancy results in very significant uncertainties about the future size of the oldest 
age groups, implying that conventional projection variants that are only based on 
alternative fertility assumptions may be grossly misleading with respect to the resulting 
uncertainty ranges. 
Substantively, this set of simulations has shown that even in the unlikely case of 
very rapid fertility declines and very low future fertility levels, combined with no gains 
in life expectancy, the population growth in Asia will certainly not come to an end in 
the near future. Only in the Pacific OECD region could such extreme trends result in a 
near term population decline. In all other regions the young age structure of the 
population and the resulting momentum will result in continued growth in the near term 
future. Beyond the next three to four decades, however, a key determinant will be the 
long-term fertility level. Sub-replacement fertility is a definitive longer-term possibility 
for most parts of Asia. Eventually, this will result in a leveling off of population growth 
and is likely to be followed by a population decline. This study has illustrated that there 
is indeed a high probability that during the second half of this century Asia will 
experience the end of population growth. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative probability of peaking. 
 
Figure 2. Total population of China and CPA (in billions). 
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Figure 3. Total population of South Asia (in billions). 
 
Figure 4. Proportion below age 20 in China and CPA. 
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Figure 5. Proportion above age 60 for Pacific Asia. 
 
Figure 6. Proportion above age 80 for Pacific OECD. 
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Figure 7. Old age dependency ratio (60+ / 20-60) for Central Asia. 
 
Figure 8. Pacific Asia, 2050 (in millions). 
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Appendix Table 1. Total population. Median and 80 percent intervals. 
 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 
Central Asia 
(in millions) 55.877 
81.373 
(72.796-89.910) 
99.811 
(79.558-120.973)
107.061 
(75.511-145.089) 
105.811 
(66.065-159.488)
South Asia 
(in billions) 1.367 
1.940 
(1.735-2.154) 
2.249 
(1.795-2.776) 
2.242 
(1.528-3.085) 
1.958 
(1.186-3.035) 
China & CPA 
(in billions) 1.408 
1.608 
(1.494-1.714) 
1.580 
(1.305-1.849) 
1.422 
(1.003-1.884) 
1.250 
(.765-1.870) 
Pacific Asia 
(in millions) 476.426
625.135 
(568.846-682.233)
701.586 
(575.128-842.238)
702.403 
(508.969-936.758) 
653.580 
(410.029-948.948)
Pacific OECD 
(in millions) 149.935
154.557 
(143.762-165.010)
148.347 
(124.643-173.823)
135.024 
(99.549-174.745) 
122.701 
(79.354-172.714)
      
Asia  
(5 regions) 
(in billions) 3.457 
4.415 
(4.058-4.782) 
4.781 
(3.971-5.703) 
4.630 
(3.394-6.101) 
4.114 
(2.684-6.085) 
 
Appendix Table 2. Proportion below age 20. Median and 80 percent intervals. 
 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 
Central Asia 
 
0.45 
.355 
(.291-.408) 
.273 
(.215-.327) 
.227 
(.172-.278) 
.196 
(.142-.254) 
South Asia 
 
0.45 
.357 
(.289-.410) 
.265 
(.206-.317) 
.205 
(.152-.260) 
.163 
(.109-.218) 
China & CPA 
 0.336 
.243 
(.196-.284) 
.204 
(.148-.257) 
.185 
(.129-.244) 
.170 
(.112-.234) 
Pacific Asia 
 0.398 
.310 
(.255-.359) 
.254 
(.199-.303) 
.210 
(.154-.260) 
.173 
(.115-.232) 
Pacific OECD 
 
0.218 
.188 
(.149-.227) 
.179 
(.127-.225) 
.162 
(.108-.214) 
.140 
(.088-.198) 
      
Asia 
(5 regions) .387 
.303 
(.252-.349) 
.241 
(.193-.287) 
.200 
(.151-.248) 
.168 
(.118-.222) 
 
Appendix Table 3. Proportion above age 60. Median and 80 percent intervals. 
 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 
Central Asia 
 0.083 
.117 
(.104-.131) 
.194 
(.153-.250) 
.279 
(.206-.373) 
.340 
(.238-.459) 
South Asia 
 0.07 
.104 
(.093-.117) 
.177 
(.141-.229) 
.271 
(.204-.361) 
.351 
(.253-.475) 
China & CPA 
 
0.099 
.188 
(.172-.205) 
.303 
(.243-.371) 
.350 
(.257-.470) 
.393 
(.267-.531) 
Pacific Asia 
 0.076 
.136 
(.123-.151) 
.227 
(.180-.285) 
.290 
(.215-.389) 
.360 
(.257-.489) 
Pacific OECD 
 0.22 
.319 
(.290-.350) 
.390 
(.312-.469) 
.427 
(.312-.549) 
.491 
(.349-.618) 
      
Asia  
(5 regions) .089 
.146 
(.133-.161) 
.233 
(.187-.286) 
.302 
(.230-.395) 
.371 
(.265-.489) 
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Appendix Table 4. Proportion above age 80. Median and 80 percent intervals. 
 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 
Central Asia 
 
0.008 
.009 
(.008-.012) 
.028 
(.018-.048) 
.064 
(.031-.130) 
.110 
(.043-.225) 
South Asia 
 
0.006 
.009 
(.008-.010) 
.020 
(.014-.032) 
.046 
(.025-.098) 
.088 
(.039-.201) 
China & CPA 
 0.009 
.018 
(.015-.022) 
.062 
(.041-.100) 
.100 
(.049-.200) 
.143 
(.052-.292) 
Pacific Asia 
 
0.006 
.012 
(.011-.015) 
.035 
(.023-.059) 
.066 
(.032-.140) 
.111 
(.045-.234) 
Pacific OECD 
 
0.035 
.075 
(.058-.096) 
.129 
(.073-.207) 
.179 
(.075-.322) 
.258 
(.097-.402) 
      
Asia  
(5 regions) .008 
.015 
(.013-.018) 
.040 
(.026-.064) 
.070 
(.037-.139) 
.117 
(.049-.235) 
 
Appendix Table 5. Old age dependency ratio (60+ / 20-60). Median and 80 percent 
intervals. 
 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 
Central Asia 
 
0.178 
.220 
(.206-.236) 
.366 
(.285-.485) 
.568 
(.385-.851) 
.738 
(.458-1.177) 
South Asia 
 
0.146 
.193 
(.183-.206) 
.318 
(.253-.417) 
.524 
(.366-.774) 
.724 
(.461-1.189) 
China & CPA 
 0.175 
.329 
(.307-.355) 
.614 
(.475-.804) 
.757 
(.499-1.214) 
.905 
(.512-1.542) 
Pacific Asia 
 
0.144 
.246 
(.230-.264) 
.438 
(.340-.573) 
.581 
(.398-.894) 
.783 
(.484-1.285) 
Pacific OECD 
 
0.392 
.649 
(.578-.725) 
.908 
(.667-1.218) 
1.037 
(.643-1.664) 
1.340 
(.755-2.184) 
 
 15
Appendix Map. Definition of the five regions. 
 
 
